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In this paper, I discuss the impact that women judges have made in property law out-
comes in Kenya. The study shows that women judges were able to influence a feminist
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“One day, the dance charts will be the biggest chart in the music world. Because we all need
to dance. This planet will be a fun planet when the judges in court will end the day with a
dance”!
Yoko Ono
The Kenya Women Judges Association
This study is the impact of women judges on property law outcomes in Kenya, with a
focus on the work of the Kenya Women Judges Association (KWJA), under the auspices
of the International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ). Although studies on indi-
vidual women judges are interesting, a focus on a methodological individualism
(Charmaz, 2017: 3) has obscured collective efforts, actions, and processes of women
judges, which are worthy of exploration in the African context. This study will begin to
include these collective actions in the various narratives on the impact of women judges,
by focusing on KWJA’s application of the Jurisprudence of Equality Programme in
property law outcomes. The central argument made in the paper is that women judges
matter for two main reasons. First, representation matters in postcolonial judiciaries such
as Kenya’s, that are seeking social transformation (including gender justice) through
constitution reforms. Such a transformation would be incomplete without including
women judges, whose perspectives have been missing in a judiciary that has historically
been largely a male enterprise, thus reflecting masculine interests in a gendered dis-
course in matrimonial property disputes. Secondly, I centre the study on the impact of
women judges in debates around feminist judging, as opposed to essentialising women
judges’ role in feminine and stereotypical norms surrounding the ‘difference’ that such
women judges bring.
I demonstrate that women judges really matter in three ways. First, I showcase the
KWJA as a co-ordinated women’s rights training programme of women judges, tailored
towards educating and training their (overwhelmingly male) peers on sexist stereotypes
about women in matrimonial property disputes, and applying international women’s
rights instruments to uphold their matrimonial property rights. It is through this pro-
gramme that a feminist jurisprudence on inheritance and matrimonial property disputes
began to emerge, prior to a new Constitution in 2010. The finding that the KWJA
educated and civilised male colleagues on sexist and stereotypical gender norms per-
ipherally and behind the scenes is congruent with some previous studies that locate
difference in challenging male bias (Hale and Hunter, 2008; Martin, 1993; Schroeder,
2002).
Second, I demonstrate that post-2010, the importance of women judges is even more
stark when decisions passed by individual women judges are compared to those of
individual male judges in the High Court. There are now more women judges in the
High Court and Court of Appeal, as a direct consequence of the 2010 Constitution that
contains a one-third minimum gender quota in all public appointments. This research
found that some individual male judges did not recognise women’s property rights, but
never women judges. Individual women judges judging solo in the High Court always
uphold women’s matrimonial property rights.
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Thirdly, I demonstrate in this paper that in collegiate benches in the High Court and
Supreme Court, however, women judges’ contributions are much more obscured, due to
an ‘almost always’ reliance on doctrines of restraint that relies on past judgments that
have stifled women’s property rights. Thus, co-ordinated programmes of women judges,
such as that of the KWJA, will be even more crucial where women judges once again
find themselves in the minority in such collegiate benches. Post-2010, I find persuasion
in the difference that feminist (as opposed to women) judges can make (Hunter, 2008),
and the resultant shift in focus to feminist methods to generate feminist outcomes, by
(even minority) women judges who provided different perspectives in collegiate
benches. (Hunter, 2015: 137). I also find persuasion in studies that problematise ‘dif-
ference’ by factors of doctrines of restraint, and patterns of judgment writing.
The IAWJ was established in 1991 as a non-profit nongovernmental organisation,
with the original purpose of enhancing access to justice for women and children. In 1994,
the IAWJ began a training programme known as ‘Jurisprudence of Equality Programme’
(JEP). This was designed to encourage its members to apply international women’s
rights laws to enhance access to justice for women and children. The training programme
resulted in formalised workshops that could be run by IAWJ members in their own
countries. The IAWJ also encouraged their members to form their own national women
judges associations. The IAWJ currently has 57 national member associations, 15 of
which are in Africa. The KWJA is one of these.
The KWJA was formed in 1993 by the only two women High Court judges in the
Kenyan judiciary at the time – Lady Justices Effie Owuor and Joyce Aluoch. At that
point, there were no women judges in the highest Court of Appeal; Owuor and Aluoch
were later joined by Lady Justice Roselyne Nambuye, the only woman magistrate at the
time. The membership has since grown, as more women judges have joined the judiciary.
The two pioneer women judges started training the male judges in the Court of Appeal,
through the IAWJ’s Jurisprudence of Equality Programme (JEP), to apply international
(women’s) rights instruments to uphold the rights of women and children, even when
these international instruments had not been domesticated in the national laws. This
study seeks to demonstrate the collective efforts of the KWJA, through the JEP, that
has brought about positive property law outcomes recognising women’s right to a share
of matrimonial property at the dissolution of marriage, and women’s inheritance of
property.
The KWJA’s Equality of Jurisprudence Programme in 1993 brought in new perspec-
tives on women’s access to property. I provide examples of cases decided before 2010
that set the precedent to a nearly equal division of matrimonial property. Before 2010,
the Court of Appeal was made up only of male judges for a long time, until 2008 [Hon.
Lady Joyce Aluoch retired in 2009 and was never replaced], while the High Court had
just two women judges for an extended period. Study participants attributed the judicial
outcomes of those cases to the efforts of the KWJA, whose members trained the male
judges of the Court of Appeal to apply CEDAW and other international women’s rights
instruments, when these had not yet been domesticated.
The first part of the paper discusses the contextual framework for the study. As a
former British colony, Kenya has a legal pluralist system in which personal moral codes
operate alongside State laws – African customary law, Hindu laws, Mohammedan laws,
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and laws relating to Christians. The Independence Constitution provided that these moral
codes were not subject to challenge for discrimination, thereby sanctioning the discrim-
ination of women in marriage. Constitutional reforms outlawed discrimination based on
sex, and through personal laws. Under the 2010 Constitution, personal laws are subject to
constitutional human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination. The 2010
Constitution also established the principle of equality of parties to a marriage. This
context is important in understanding property law outcomes before and after 2010.
The second part of the paper discusses its theoretical basis. Studies on the impact of
women judges to gender justice have tended to fall generally into two camps: the
legitimacy argument and the difference argument. In this study, I discuss the different
ways in which ‘difference’ has been conceptualised, and the conceptualisation of ‘dif-
ference’. The third part discusses the methodological approach of the paper and methods,
while the last part discusses findings, both on the influence of the KWJA in property law
outcomes pre-2010, and the influence of women judges to women’s access to property
post-2010.
Postcolonial Constitution Reforms
African women’s exclusion from access to property has a colonial legacy that has had a
lasting and stubborn impact. British colonial authorities formed what has been termed a
‘patriarchal coalition’ with traditional male elders, as their interests and their desire to
control women coalesced – the colonialists’ capitalist interests, and those of the African
male leaders to preserve patrilineal male interests in property, and to control women who
would provide domestic and farm labour, while their husbands worked in the city for the
colonialists (Chanock, 1982; Lovett, 1989: 28; Parpart, 1988). Women, therefore, had
access to property, but no right to it, and would walk away with nothing at the end of a
marriage by death or divorce. I argue therefore that the impact that women judges have
made, and can make, is in ‘asking the African woman question’ (Durojaye and Oluduro,
2016). This is a twin-approach of reversing colonial legacy, and underscoring the value
of domestic work in feminist legal discourse. (Duffy, 2011; Ferrant et al., 2014; Folbre,
2006).
Post-independence, the applicable law in relation to division of matrimonial property
was the English Married Women’s Property Act of 1882, which was applied to Kenya as
a statute of general application. Section 17 stated that ‘in any question between husband
and wife as to the title to or possession of property, [ . . . ] the judge of the High Court
may make such orders with respect to the property in dispute, and to the costs of and
consequent on the application as he thinks fit’. Through this statute of general applica-
tion, the courts continued to make discretionary determinations that perpetuated the
colonial legacy of excluding women from accessing matrimonial property. This statute
of general application remained in force in Kenya until 2013, when it was repealed by the
Matrimonial Property Act, by then having been repealed in England since 1970.
The 1963 Independence Constitution sanctioned discrimination based on sex under
personal laws. Postcolonial feminist scholars such as Nyamu-Musembi (2013) and Manji
(1999) discuss the discriminatory effects that these plurality clauses recognising the
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simultaneous application of multiple personal laws had on the legal status of women in
postcolonial contexts.
The 2010 Constitution ushered in a new wave of positive change for women and
marriage: under Article 45(3) and (4), ‘parties to a marriage are entitled to equal rights at
the time of the marriage, during the marriage and at the dissolution of the marriage’,
which provision applies to any ‘marriages concluded under any tradition, or system of
religious, personal or family law; and any system of personal and family law under any
tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion [ . . . ]’. What this
means is that discrimination in marriage through personal laws is no longer allowed
in the Constitution. This has had a profound effect to property law outcomes in Kenya
post-2010.
The Matrimonial Property Act 2013 was one of the laws enacted pursuant to Article
45 of the Constitution. This legislation recognised that ownership of matrimonial prop-
erty will vest in the spouses according to each spouse’s contribution towards its acqui-
sition. Non-monetary contribution to matrimonial property was also recognised under
this legislation, which is defined at section 2 to include ‘domestic work and management
of the matrimonial home, childcare, companionship, management of family business or
property; and farm work’. The Court of Appeal noted in ZWN v PNN that the Act was
enacted to correct the injustice in the precedent set by the Court of Appeal that spouses
must prove monetary contribution.
Regarding the right to inheritance, this was recognised in 1972 for wives and daugh-
ters through the Law of Succession Act, [including wives in polygamous unions] where
this is contested, and the deceased died intestate. This did not, however, preclude a father
from excluding their daughters from inheritance by way of testate succession. Before
2010, the courts carried out a ‘balancing act’ between the provisions of the Law of
Succession Act, and the provisions of the Constitution that allowed discriminatory
personal laws against women’s rights to inherit property.
Why Women Judges Really Matter: Theoretical Debates
Studies on women judges have been framed in two ways: first in terms of ‘difference’
(Berns, 1999; Kay and Sparrow, 2001; Martin, 1989a, 1989b; Menkel-Meadow, 2011;
Rehaag, 2011; Schultz, 2001; Steffensmeier and Herbert, 1990; Wilson, 1990), and
‘legitimacy’ (Feenan, 2008; Kenney, 2013; Malleson, 2016) – widening the scope
beyond women to other underrepresented groups in the judiciary. The question in the
legitimacy argument is really one of why diversity in the judiciary matters.
Those who rely on ‘difference’ posit that women contribute a new and essentially
female perspective to lawyering, which is more empathic, sensitive, gentle, collabora-
tive, co-operative and contextual, and averse to adversarial modes of dispute resolution
based on a binary, rights-based justice (Binion, 1991; Bowman, 1999; Menkel-Meadow,
1985; Rush, 1993; Scales, 1986; Sherry, 1986a, 1986b; Tobias, 1993; West, 1998).
Justice O’Connor and others criticised this approach for falling into an essentialist trap
based on stereotypes ‘so nearly echo(ing) the Victorian myth of the “True Woman” that
kept women out of the law for so long’ (O’Connor, 1991). A second approach within the
difference argument is that women judges will bring to bear their experiences to judging
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by demonstrating the fallacy of the neutrality of legal rules and principles that are biased
towards men and against women, and contribute to a reassessment of jurisprudential
norms that perpetuate oppressive gender stereotypes (Wilson, 1990) – that men and
women have different experiences in the world, and laws made by men will always
reflect men’s concerns. Some of these contributions have been theorised as the ‘battered
women’s syndrome’, and sexual assault and sexual harassment cases (Mackinnon, 1983;
Menkel-Meadow, 1991). Still others argue that women judges will sensitise and educate
their male colleagues behind the scenes about sexism, stereotypical gender norms and
male bias in judging (Hale and Hunter, 2008; Martin, 1993; Schroeder, 2002). This is the
conceptualisation of difference that is closest to the finding in the study on the work of
KWJA pre-2010, in training their male colleagues through the Equality of Jurisprudence
Programme. This approach, however, does not explain the difficulties for women judges
in collegial decision-making post-2010, when women judges joined the Court of Appeal.
The ‘legitimacy’ argument rests on the premise that increasing the diversity of the
judiciary based on categories such as gender, race, class, and disability is an essential
feature of democratic legitimacy (Feenan, 2008; Kenney, 2013; Malleson, 2003). In the
book Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter, Kenney’s analysis
of data on sex differences in judging provided little support for a unique style of judging
attributable to women, and cautions that we cannot exclude women from juries or
judging – because, if we do, justice will not be seen to be done. The process and the
result will both lack legitimacy (Kenney, 2013: 28–40).
Recognising some of the difficulties and limitations associated with expectations
about difference and diversity, this has led to a recasting of the ways in which difference
and judicial diversity might be understood. Some of these are explored in this study:
Rosemary Hunter’s discussion on whether feminist as opposed to women judges make a
difference (2008), and the possibility that even a minority of women judges can provide
different perspectives in collegial decision-making (2015: 137); Erica Rackley’s focus
on transformative diversity beyond inclusive diversity (Rackley, 2013b); Elliot’s ‘doc-
trines of restraint’ and norms of collegiality as limitations to difference in collegial
decision-making (Elliot, 2001); Belleau’s and Johnson’s (2008) study on the potential
significance of dissent as a ‘gendered site of judicial difference’ (Belleau and Johnson,
2008); and studies on patterns of judgment writing, specifically authorship and unani-
mity in judgment writing (such as Lynch and Williams, 2004; McComick, 2000).
Hunter’s focus on feminist rather than women judges (Hunter, 2008, 2012, 2013) has
opened up new possibilities – this ‘has created exciting new opportunities which reveal
what is possible when the world is viewed through a feminist lens. It avoids essentialis-
ing women and actually facilitates more radical discussions around difference as it
removes the shackles of trying to separate the feminism and difference’ (McLoughlin,
2015: 277–278). Hunter’s recasting to focus on feminist judges has influenced the
Feminist Judgments Project in England and Wales (Hunter et al., 2010), and subsequent
projects that re-write landmark judgments by infusing them with feminist reasoning and
methods to generate feminist outcomes. Some of these are ‘asking the woman question’
(Bartlett, 1990: 837), recognising the gendered aspect of judging and including women
in judging or legal discourse; challenging gender bias, contextualisation, and particular-
ity; making choices while balancing competing feminist interests and perspectives;
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providing remedies to correct injustices; promoting substantive equality; and drawing on
feminist legal scholarship to inform decisions. (Hunter, 2013: 401).
There have also been reformulations on the purpose of diversity, especially by Erica
Rackley and Rosemary Hunter. Rackley proposes reformulating diversity beyond inclu-
sion to ‘transformative diversity’ (Rackley, 2013): ‘while inclusive diversity is con-
cerned simply with bringing a wider variety of backgrounds or attributes to the bench,
transformative diversity seeks to ensure that those diverse characteristics and experi-
ences are actually tapped into, that they lead to diversity in judging’ (Rackley, 2013:
512). Hunter argues that increasing judicial diversity may have an impact – maybe not so
much on substantive outcomes (except in a minority of cases), but in the fact that even
minority feminist judges might provide different perspectives in collegial decision-
making (Hunter, 2015: 136–137).
Elliot (2001) proposed the ‘doctrines of restraint’ as a more effective way to test
‘gender’ and ‘difference’ – the doctrine of precedent, and judicial norms of collegiality.
Elliot argues that ‘procedural law and associated norms of judicial behaviour may
produce a better focus of study’ (Elliot, 2001: 43). Capitalising on studies that have
found ‘measurable differences between men and women in their responses to conflict’
(Elliot, 2001: 43), such as Shelley Taylor et al. (2000), Elliot writes that ‘if such differ-
ences exist, one would predict that male and female judges would respond differently to
the doctrines of restraint of precedent, incrementalism, justiciability and collegiality –
collectively the doctrines of restraint’ (Elliot, 2000: 44).1 Elliot emphasises ‘inequities of
precedent and adherence to precedent when those doctrines protect laws based on gender
or racial stereotypes’ (Elliot, 2001: 45) in that ‘any system that demands fidelity to
existing precedent hinders change and reinforces the benefits given preferred groups
under the status quo’ (Elliot, 2001: 44). Elliot makes three general statements: first that
‘women on the bench may find it more difficult to overcome the doctrines of restraint in
expressing their true views of the law’ (Elliot, 2001: 45); secondly, women may find it
easier to work within the doctrines of restraint to achieve their goals; and thirdly, the
‘feminine voice in jurisprudence’ may simply be female judges’ responses to these
doctrines of restraint. Elliot writes that,
if women react to stress and conflict by wanting to ‘tend and befriend’, female judges should
respond more strongly to doctrines of restraint than male judges. If aversion to conflict
makes disagreement unpleasant, women on the bench probably would be more reluctant to
dissent or even concur separately in panel decisions and would reveal higher levels of
adherence to the doctrines of restraint. Female judges would be more likely to work to
create consensus when writing for the majority, which again would result in higher con-
formity with the doctrines of restraint . . . because departure from precedent is an act of
conflict. (Elliot, 2001: 45)
To support the three general statements on the response of women judges to doctrines
of restraint, Elliot proposes three hypotheses for future studies: female judges will
dissent less often than male judges, they will do so later in their career, and will depart
from precedent less frequently than male judges; secondly that ‘women judges will
spend a longer time than male judges on the bench before they dissent’ (Elliot, 2001:
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45), and thirdly that ‘female judges will depart from precedent less frequently than male
judges, whether writing for the majority or dissent’ (Elliot, 2001: 46).
The reliance of Elliot’s study on moral reasoning, particularly tend-and-befriend
studies, is still problematic, as it remains within the psychoanalytic debates, a fact
acknowledged in the paper (Elliot, 2001: 51). I find persuasion in Elliot’s reliance on
studies that find the doctrines of restraint as a hinderance to change, but much less so in
their three hypotheses on the differences between men and women in patterns of dissent
based on psychoanalytic theories of aversion to conflict. Elliot’s three hypotheses have
not been adequately tested by further empirical studies, and have been complicated by
subsequent studies on differences in patterns of dissent between male and female judges.
Belleau’s and Johnson’s (2008) study on differences in patterns of dissent between
male and women judges did not provide straightforward answers. Their study on seven
women judges of the Supreme Court of Canada showed that some women judges gen-
erated more dissents the longer they were in the court, while others started as great
dissenters, but became much less so the longer they were in the court (Belleau and
Johnson, 2008: 64). One woman judge had a low rate of dissent, but was in the court
for only 5 years – whether the low rate of dissent would have persisted had the judge
stayed longer is unclear (Belleau and Johnson, 2008: 64). Further complications are that
‘dissent, like difference itself, is deeply relational [ . . . ] a dissent has meaning only in the
context of the majority against which it stands in opposition’. Secondly, dissent as a
phenomenon predates the entry of women on the Supreme Court – they therefore caution
against ‘the risk of apprehending as “gendered” differences that which may find root in
other sources . . . what identities do we privilege, what is the deemed content of those
identities, and how do we know we have correctly determined which identities get
attached to which bodies?’ (Belleau and Johnson, 2008: 66).
More generally, Belleau and Johnson cast doubt on the reliability of quantitative
studies on levels of dissent in measuring difference. Quantitative studies such as Lynch’s
and Williams’ annual studies (2004–2019), and McComick (2000) show a general dis-
inclination to dissent and higher levels of unanimity in judging. Belleau and Johnson
caution that the focus should be on the substance and reasons for the dissents, more than
the number of the dissents themselves:
The statistics, while making visible some of the variations in patterns of voting and writing,
tell us very little about the substance of the disagreements, the shape of the written reasons,
or the context in which the conflicts emerged . . . dissent is something that necessarily
emerges out of a context, and shifts in the context matter hugely. (Belleau and Johnson,
2008: 64, 66)
Due to the potential complications of quantitative studies, I have chosen to find
persuasion in the general statements on doctrines of restraint as a potential hinderance
to change (Elliot, 2001), dissent as a potential site of gender difference (Belleau and
Johnson, 2008), and that patterns of judgment writing matter (such as McComick, 2000)
– but not to focus on the falsifiability of hypotheses on different levels of dissents or
patterns of judgment writing between men and women judges. On dissent, Belleau and
Johnson write that
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all judges appear to grapple constantly with the unavoidable tension between the demands
of stability and responsive change. But the grappling is intensified for appellate judges, who
bring multiple skills and divergent life experiences to bear on a single case, working as a
group to do justice in ways that the world should be legally ordered. And in the resolution of
these disagreements, judges sometimes find themselves in the space of dissent. (Belleau and
Johnson, 2008: 57)
On patterns of judgment writing, concern has been raised on the high levels of
unanimity and consensus, and disinclination to dissent in the High Court of Australia,
the French High Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Supreme Court of the
USA. Chief Justice McLachlin of the Canadian Supreme Court remarked that they were
aiming to ‘reduce the unnecessary differences’ (Belleau and Johnson, 2008: 67), while
Chief Justice John Roberts of the US Supreme Court stated that he ‘wants the justices to
speak with one voice as much as possible, to decide cases 9 to 0, with no pesky dissents
or concurrences’ (Belleau and Johnson, 2008: 67). McLoughlin observes that ‘authorship
remains fraught in this respect, as joint judgments do not conventionally give away the
identity of the writer . . . ’ (McLoughlin, 2015: 288). Lynch and Williams (2014: 545)
argue that there is need to understand that who ‘individual judges are and who they sit
alongside matters in our attempts to fully appreciate the High Court as a public institu-
tion’. In their study on patterns of judgment writing and dissent as a potential site of
difference, Belleau and Johnson (2008) and McLoughlin (2015) conclude that, because
dissent sometimes has a gendered face, the trend of reductions in dissenting judgments
and concurrences suggests a need to think seriously about their impact.
These trends on unanimity in judging have also not been without controversy – Justice
Heydon of the French High Court expressed distaste regarding practices that forge
consensus over disagreement; what he terms ‘judicial herd behaviour’ and ‘excessively
dominant personalities’ in single composite judgments:
Composite judgments raise questions. Who did the work? Did every judge understand the
judgment? Did every judge closely examine it? Did a confident ‘specialist’ assume dom-
inance over nervous ‘generalists’? What, if any, compromises were made? [ . . . ]. The same
difficulty exists where a judge delivers a full judgment and the remaining judges say, ‘I
agree’. No doubt the judges do sincerely agree to something, but to what? (Heydon, 2013:
212)
Justice Kiefel of the Australian High Court argued that ‘collegiality is not compro-
mise’ (Kiefel, 2014: 7), asking: ‘What is the vice in seeking to persuade colleagues,
one’s equals, to one’s point of view? It is hardly as if they are unused to efforts of
persuasion’ (Kiefel, 2014: 4). Instead, he points to a potential tension between judges’
individualism and collegiality on the bench, and states that ‘a greater difficulty presented
by the practice of joint judgments may arise not from the pressure of colleagues to join
in, but from a personal desire to stand out, to have one’s own voice and develop one’s
own reputation’ (Kiefel, 2014: 4).
In this paper, I demonstrate the work of the KWJA in training their male peers to
apply international women’s rights to matrimonial property disputes in the Court of
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Appeal before 2010, when there were absolutely no women judges in that court. I
compare judgments on matrimonial property division decided by women judges, and
those of male judges in the High Court post-2010, and make the point that women judges
always uphold the wives’ matrimonial property rights, while male judges in the High
Court don’t always do so, and sometimes employ sexist reasoning. I examine the extent
to which doctrines of restraint, authorship and patterns of judgment writing have com-
plicated the work of women judges (including KWJA members) in the Court of Appeal
post-2010, after they gained access to the court. For matrimonial property disputes, to
what extent have they challenged judicial precedent set by male judges that wives must
prove their monetary contribution? It is in these three ways that I demonstrate the
difference that women judges in Kenya (and the KWJA in particular) have made to
women’s property law outcomes in Kenya, and discuss the competing interests that
members of the KWJA have had to balance in developing the jurisprudence in matri-
monial property disputes.
Researching Women Judges and Property Law Outcomes
in Kenya
I am deeply conscious of the fact that studies on women judges have taken a form of
methodological individualism that is characteristic of Anglo-North American positivist
epistemologies that shape qualitative research (see Charmaz, 2017: 33, 34). Some indi-
genous and international scholars have found that methodological individualism does not
fit in societies that are based on collectivism, homogeneity and personal networks (Abso-
lon and Willett, 2005; Bhattacharya, 2013; Hsiung, 2012, 2015; Kovach, 2005, 2009).
Park and Lunt (2015: 5) write that ‘social research methods are in fact typically onto-
logically and epistemologically individualistic’. The methods have been developed to
study particular ‘social’ settings (western, industrialised, capitalist – but in so doing, a
broader methodological veil is drawn across all cultures and situations). In this study I
attempt, as far as possible, to adopt a methodological self-consciousness that seeks to not
only question taken-for-granted language and meanings, but also take a strong reflexivity
(Harding, 1991) that locates the [women] judges in Kenya in their specific social,
cultural, and historical context, in relation to other predominantly western projects on
the impact of women judges. I also acknowledge my positionality (see Clarke, 2005) in
the research, as one that has been ‘brought up’ in the Anglo-North American ways of
doing research, and liberal legalism that places a focus on individual liberties.
I employ a constructivist grounded theory methodology (Charmaz, 2017). I employ
qualitative methods, because I am interested in the substance of the reasons for dissent or
concurrence with other judges, and not on the number of dissents alone. I place con-
currences or dissents in context – that is, in relation to the facts and legal questions in the
case, and in relation to the other members of the bench. I employ Hunter’s focus on
feminist rather than women judges, for the obvious reason that not all women judges are
members of the KWJA, and certainly not all women judges are feminist. I explore the
extent to which the feminist methods to generate feminist outcomes have been employed
by KWJA members. I am particularly interested in the feminist method of ‘asking the
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woman question’ (Bartlett, 1990: 837) that has been extended to the African context:
‘asking the African woman question’ (Durojaye and Oluduro, 2016).
The empirical study combines textual analysis of cases as the primary data collection
method, augmented with a methodological triangulation of three research methods,
namely elite interviews, focus-group discussions and documentary analysis. I decided
to use triangulation as a validation strategy to eliminate data bias and avoid the defi-
ciencies of using any single method (Denzin, 1978; Fielding and Fielding, 1996; Flick,
1992; 2004: 144). I conducted the fieldwork study in Kenya in October to December
2018, and obtained ethical approval before undertaking the fieldwork. I interviewed 10
judges of the High Court, Court of Appeal (3 of whom are members of KWJA), and the
Supreme Court; 2 academics with expertise in family law and gender studies; and 12
others who were either constitutional review experts, civil society stakeholders that were
active in constitutional reform processes, and/or public interest litigators. In selecting the
interview participants, I employed a purposive sampling method to identify and recruit
interview participants in congruence with the purpose and information I wanted to obtain
from the participant. Therefore, they are not a representative sample of all the judges,
constitution reform stakeholders, or public interest litigators. I was more interested in
validating data from documents and judgments than in proving any quantifiable and
falsifiable hypotheses.
Focus-group discussions were made up of six public interest litigators in each,
sourced directly from civil society organisations that have instituted or taken part in pro
bono or public interest litigation relating to women’s rights. Both focus-group discus-
sions took place on 8th November 2018, at the British Institute of Eastern Africa in
Nairobi.
The documents I examined were those on broadly constitutional reforms, to examine
the extent to which women’s access to property was part of the agenda on constitution
reform. I also examined reports of the Judiciary on judicial reforms and access to justice
generally, and of the KWJA on women’s access to justice.
I examined laws on inheritance and matrimonial property, and landmark decisions on
inheritance and matrimonial property disputes. These are divided roughly into two
sections – those decided before 2010, and those after 2010. I applied a purposeful
sampling method to identify these decisions, either because they were identified as
landmark and precedent-setting by study participants, or because they received wide
media attention. Two of these cases are also being rewritten and critiqued in the ongoing
African Feminist Judgments Project. These cases are not a representative sample of all
the matrimonial property and inheritance disputes before and after 2010. Pre-2010, I
focus on only one case on inheritance: Rono v Rono. Matrimonial property disputes
considered in the paper pre-2010 are of interest to this study, because the outcomes have
a link with the influence of the KWJA’s Equality of Jurisprudence Programme. Notably,
there were no women judges at all during their adjudication. In these cases, the wives
were awarded an equal share of the matrimonial property. Their contribution to the
property was deemed to be both direct and indirect, and considered and assessed as
equal to that of their husbands. Landmark decisions on matrimonial property disputes
post-2010 are discussed in the second section of the findings. Such cases demonstrate the
challenges relating to matrimonial property disputes post-2010.
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To analyse the data, I used a thematic coding structure, inspired by Boyatzis (1998)
and Braun and Clarke (2006, 2012), and assisted by the computer software NVivo.
The Impact of Women Judges on Property Law Outcomes
Pre-2010
Before 2010, the jurisprudence on the division of matrimonial property had developed to
50:50 per cent – wives’ contribution, both direct and indirect, was considered and
assessed as equal to that of their husbands. Some of these cases were Kivuitu v Kivuitu,
Essa v Essa, Nderitu v Nderitu, Kamore v Kamore, Muthembwa v Muthembwa, and
Mereka v Mereka. Al were decided in the Court of Appeal; there were no women judges
in the Court of Appeal at this time. Study participants attributed the outcomes in these
cases to the work and efforts of the KWJA through its Equality of Jurisprudence
Programme.
In Kivuitu v Kivuitu, the estranged husband and wife had registered the matrimonial
property jointly as a family venture, and the wife had made substantial indirect contri-
butions to the purchase of the matrimonial home. The Court divided the matrimonial
property equally. Justice Omolo ruled that,
where a husband acquires property from his salary or business and registers it in the joint
names of himself and his wife without specifying any proportions, the courts must take it
that such property, being a family asset, is owned in equal shares [ . . . ]. It will be extremely
cruel to the wife and to the other women in her position that they can only have a share in
property acquired during marriage if they can prove financial contribution.
Justice Omollo advised that even if the property is registered in the name of the
husband only, the wife can apply to the court, under section 17 of the Married Women’s
Property Act, for the court to determine her interest in the property, and to assess the
value of her non-monetary contribution to the property. Thus, in this case, the determi-
nation of an equal share was because the husband had registered the matrimonial prop-
erty in their joint names, and that the wife had made substantial indirect contributions to
the property. Even if the property was not registered in the joint spouses’ names, the
court was still prepared to assess and determine the value of the wife’s non-monetary
contribution to the property.
Essa v Essa followed the precedent in Kivuitu v Kivuitu, bt held that there is no
presumption of equal share to any or all property acquired during the subsistence of a
marriage.
In Nderitu v Nderitu, the Court of Appeal held that the English Married Women’s
Property Act did not discriminate between statutory and customary marriage [ . . . ] all
that a wife needed to prove under the Act was that she was married to the husband at the
time of lodging her application, that the property subject to the proceedings was acquired
during the subsistence of the marriage, and that she had contributed directly or indirectly
to the acquisition of the assets. When determining the issue of contribution, the court
must assess the value of a wife’s non-monetary contribution to determine her interest in
the disputed property. Childbearing is also a contribution to the common good of the
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family, and despite this being an indirect contribution, it nonetheless entitled the wife to
an equal share of the family property. This case was important because the Court of
Appeal recognised for the first time childbearing as an entitlement to a wife’s equal share
in matrimonial property.
In Muthembwa v Muthembwa, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Court in
section 17 of the MWPA 1882 extends to shares in limited liability companies owned by
the parties, but that it had no jurisdiction to distribute properties registered in the name of
the company in which the couple are shareholders. The court stated:
If there are disputes between husband and wife as to their respective rights to the shares in a
company registered in the name of one spouse, then the court, like in the case of any other
property in dispute between husband and wife has power to ascertain the respective ben-
eficial rights of husband and wife to the disputed shares. It can declare [ . . . ] that one spouse
holds a certain number of shares in trust for the other spouse. What the court cannot do
under section 17 of the 1882 Act, like in respect of all other properties, is to order the
transfer of the legal titles to property or in other words to pass proprietary interest from one
spouse to the other.
This case was important because husbands had begun the practice of registering
property acquired during marriage in limited liability companies, thus making it difficult
for wives to lay claim to shares in those properties. The judge in this case was prepared to
go behind the corporate veil, and assess the value of wives’ shares in those limited
liability companies.
In Echaria, the parties divorced in 1987, after which the wife filed a dispute in the
High Court for the distribution of the matrimonial property, which included Tigoni Farm
comprising 118 acres. The High Court determined an equal share to the farm in 1993.
The husband appealed in the Court of Appeal, in which the judgment of the High Court
was set aside. The Court of Appeal awarded the wife less than a quarter of the farm
acreage (25 acres), and the rest went to the husband. The Court of Appeal rejected the
argument that domestic chores or childbearing ought to be taken as a form of contribu-
tion to matrimonial property. The court set the precedent that a spouse must prove their
financial contribution to matrimonial property (direct or indirect), and that there is no
presumption of equal division.2 The Court of Appeal divided the matrimonial property
between the estranged husband and wife in three quarter to one quarter shares respec-
tively, as the property was registered in the name of the husband only. The bench was
made up of five male judges.
Echaria cast doubt on the jurisprudence recognising wives’ non-monetary and indi-
rect contribution, as had been developing in the previous cases Kivuitu, Nderitu,
Muthembwa and Essa. This precedent has been found to be regressive (Maina, 2013),
and was in fact referred to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in
2009 by the Federation of Women Lawyers. The African Commission ruled that the case
was inadmissible because it was filed 31 months after the Court of Appeal Ruling, which
the Court found an unreasonable delay.
On inheritance of property, Rono v Rono was originally a succession matter in the
High Court of Eldoret involving a man who died intestate and was survived by two
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wives, six daughters, and three sons. The dispute was on the distribution of the assets and
liabilities of the estate. The woman judge determined that under the Marakwet customary
law,3 the inheritance system in polygamous families is patrilineal; property is distributed
according to the wives’ households irrespective of the number of children, and that
daughters receive no inheritance. The woman judge disregarded the provisions of the
Law of Succession Act that provides that all children are entitled to equal inheritance,
and argued that the daughters will get married and inherit property from their new
families, and that this will put them at an unfair advantage over their brothers. On appeal
to the Court of Appeal, the High Court decision was reversed for relying on Marakwet
Customary Law, and not the Law of Succession Act. The Court of Appeal also found that
the daughters were already at an advanced age, making the argument of marriage
irrelevant.
Rono elicited great interest, because the woman judge was seen to be advancing male
interests. Court of Appeal Justice #3 also expressed disappointment: ‘in fact she always
says being brought up in the village and being cultured in a way that women don’t have
anything to do with those things – she said you know, you don’t have a right!’ Study
participants observed that gender bias is found in both men and women, ‘because you
know that in any system of oppression [ . . . ] it’s the people [ . . . ] the victims who
internalise it and socialise it. So they too don’t know any different . . . You have to
unlearn. It’s an ideological issue. It’s not something which by your nature inherently
that you understand’ (Constitutional law expert #1). Public Interest Litigator #4 believed
that it is the reason why a woman judge may be ‘advancing a man’s agenda, or an
agenda that is detrimental for women’.
Supreme Court Justice #3 observed that ‘There are some judges, whether men or
women, who understand the transformative nature – who understand human rights
language – and that will impact on how they interpret human rights. Yes, it has more
to do with philosophical orientation – I don’t think it’s just because someone is a woman’
(Supreme Court Justice #3).
High Court Justice #4 explained that old cases on women’s property rights proved that
a judge’s gender is not especially significant, because the pre-2010 landmark cases that
recognised wives’ contribution in marriage were decided by male judges. However,
Supreme Court Justice #2 was unequivocally of the view that women judges in the
KWJA were responsible for the judicial outcomes that recognised wives’ indirect con-
tribution to matrimonial property, specifically Lady Justices Aluoch and Awuor.
Court of Appeal Justice #3 spoke at length of the behind-the-scenes work of Owuor
and Aluoch, through the Equality of Jurisprudence Programme to train male judges of
the Court of Appeal to apply international principles of equality such as the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Court of Appeal
Justice #2 expressed a similar view.
The ‘difference’ that KWJA made to matrimonial disputes before 2010 was, there-
fore, in challenging male bias through educating and civilising their male colleagues on
sexism, stereotyping and gender bias (Hale and Hunter, 2008; Martin, 1993; Schroeder,
2002), and training them to apply international women’s rights through the Equality of
Jurisprudence Programme. It is therefore not a just a lucky coincidence that the jur-
isprudence on matrimonial property disputes in Kenya started to shift towards equitable
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(if not equal) distribution after the KWJA was formed in 1993, as evidenced in the cases
already discussed, until that jurisprudence was unfortunately overturned by an all-male
bench in Echaria.
The Impact of Women Judges on Property Law Outcomes
Post-2010
The promulgation of the new constitution in 2010 provided women in Kenya with
opportunities that had not been available to them before, as it opened up spaces for more
women in public appointments through the new one-third gender quota (Kamau, 2013).
The quota provided opportunities for more women judicial officers not only to join the
judiciary, but also to rise to rise to higher ranks beyond the magistracy, where they were
mostly concentrated – to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court
(Kamau, 2013: 181–182). When comparing female judges and magistrates in 2010
(when the Constitution was promulgated), and in 2016/17, women remained in the
minority, but increased slightly in most areas, particularly in Magistrate and Kadhi
Courts (going from about one-third to almost 80%).4 The gender quota has had the effect
of increasing the chances of women judges sitting in collegiate benches in the Court of
Appeal to adjudicate on matrimonial property disputes. Three of these minority women
judges are members of the KWJA; three of them are and have been active participants in
matrimonial property disputes in the Court of Appeal.
In this section, I demonstrate that in the High Court, members of the KWJA have
contributed to a feminist jurisprudence in matrimonial property, especially when one
contrasts single judgments made by women judges versus those of male judges, in which
some of the latter demonstrate clear bias towards men. I will give examples of cases in
the High Court in which the judges declaring that non-monetary contribution of matri-
monial property should not be considered for division are notably male judges. For the
Court of Appeal, such a feminist contribution by KWJA members is complicated by the
doctrines of restraint, and collegiate patterns of judgment writing. I discuss three factors
standing in the way of a jurisprudence of equal division of matrimonial property in the
courts. The first factor is male sexist bias in judging. The second and third factors are the
doctrines of restraint (notably rules of precedent – the question whether Echaria is still
good law), and patterns of judgment writing in which collegiate benches write composite
judgments.
Doctrines of Restraint: Is Echaria Still Good Law?
The issue I examine in this section is the extent to which the precedent of Echaria has
been challenged, and the extent to which women judges have contributed to that chal-
lenge. Study participants expressed disappointment that judges in recent cases have not
reflected the provisions of the Constitution on the equality of parties to marriage, but
have put wives to task to prove monetary contribution. Public Interest Litigator #5
reported that ‘[ . . . ] it’s hard to quantify non-monetary contribution, but I think it has
also been controversial’. Court of Appeal Justice #3 reported that their colleagues say
that ‘[a woman does not have to prove financial contribution if they have been looking
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after the children and the home], but when it comes to applying it, [ . . . ], it becomes very
difficult [ . . . ] It is the judge’s discretion – depending on the evidence, and how they
understand the evidence’.
The subjective assessment of the value of non-monetary contribution to marriage
means that there may be avenues for considerations of extraneous subjective factors –
such as the judges’ own perceptions, beliefs, and world views. Court of Appeal Justice #4
observed that ‘matrimonial property disputes are seldom straightforward’. Some of these
cases reveal misogynist attitudes about the worth of women in marriage, a point dis-
cussed further in the next section.
I summarise below the outcomes of matrimonial property disputes in both the High
Court and the Court of Appeal. I make a distinction between cases that were filed before
2010, but finalised after the 2010 Constitution came into force, and those that were filed
after 2010. The year the case was filed is important. For cases filed before 2010, one can
see that two judges in the High Court – Lady Justice Roselyne Nambuye in ZWN v PNN
(filed in 2004), and Lady Justice Ang’awa in MSK v SNK (filed in 1997) disregarded
Echaria, and awarded equal division of the matrimonial property, even when the con-
stitutional principle of equality of parties to a marriage was not yet established. Lady
Justice Nambuye relied on CEDAW and other international human rights instruments.
Both Lady Justices are KWJA members. For cases filed post-2010, one can see that there
isn’t yet a firm stand by the courts on whether Echaria is still good law, as there are even
conflicting decisions from the Court of Appeal on the same matter (such as in PWK v
JKG on the one hand, and VWN v FN on the other hand). The High Court is bound by
Echaria until it is repealed by the Court of Appeal itself – this explains the outcomes in
High Court cases such as UMM v IMM and FIDA-K v AG & Another.
In UMM v IMM in the High Court, Justice Francis Tuiyott stated thus: ‘I take the view
that at the dissolution of marriage, each partner should walk away with what he/she
deserves. What one deserves must be arrived at by considering her/his respective con-
tribution, whether it be monetary or non-monetary’.
PWK v JKG was an appeal from the High Court of Kenya at Nyeri – the issues were:
(a) whether, and if so to what extent, the appellant wife contributed to the acquisition of
matrimonial property, (b) whether the properties registered in the name of the respondent
husband’s company were part of matrimonial property and available for distribution, and
(c) whether the properties admittedly sold or otherwise disposed of by the respondent
during the pendency of the litigation should be taken into account in the distribution.
Lady Justice Roselyne Nambuye, Justice Waki, and Justice Kiage stated thus: ‘We are of
the respectful view that the principles restated by Echaria are good law and contribution
as the basis for distribution of matrimonial property remains valid’. In this case, the wife
had made both direct (hence the reliance on Echaria) and indirect contributions to the
matrimonial properties; she was working as a nurse, and then later ran the family
company business – she and the husband were the only shareholders in the company.
The husband claimed that the wife had no beneficial interest, because her contribution to
some of the properties was minimal, and that in some of the properties, he was the sole
contributor. What was interesting about this case was that some of the properties regis-
tered in the name of the company were held by the Court of Appeal as matrimonial
properties, because the appellant wife was running the company business as an indirect
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contribution, – but the trial High Court [male] judge had failed to pay attention to this.
The Court of Appeal judges went behind the corporate veil [Salomon v Salomon] and
held it to be matrimonial property, of which the wife was awarded a half share in one of
them, and two others were transferred to her absolutely, as she was residing on those
properties.
In ZWN v PNN in the High Court, the estranged couple was married in 1961 under the
African Christian Marriage & Divorce Act, and divorced in 2001. Both were civil
servants, and all the properties registered in the name of the husband in good faith; there
were no audited accounts on how much each spouse contributed to the matrimonial
property. The wife claimed 50:50 non-monetary contribution from looking after the
children, the home, and the farm, and fulfilling wifely duties. Lady Justice Roselyne
Nambuye found non-monetary contribution in favour of wife as 50:50. The judge dis-
cussed the injustice occasioned by Echaria, even though it was still the position in law
then, and was to be corrected by Article 45 of the Constitution and the Matrimonial
Property Bill. However, the case was filed in 2004, meaning that the 2010 Constitution
could not apply. Nambuye therefore relied on international human rights instruments to
determine equal contribution to matrimonial property.
The husband in ZWN v PNN appealed against the decision of Lady Justice Roselyne
Nambuye in PNN v ZWN. The all-male bench upheld Nambuye’s judgment, adding that
it was evident that when the husband lagged behind in mortgage payments for one of the
properties, he relied on funds from the joint account that was made of proceeds from the
farm. Waki JA took the school of thought that Echaria has been rendered obsolete by
the Constitution and the Matrimonial Property Act 2013, and Azangalala JA concurred.
Waki JA stated: ‘Speaking for myself, I would find little, if any, utility in applying the
Echaria case post the provisions of the Constitution and the Matrimonial Property Act
examined above. The former is loud on equality while the latter has an expansive
definition of “contribution.” As stated earlier, those provisions lay a new basis for the
future which will generate its own jurisprudence’. Justice Kiage JA however, dissented,
and was of the view that Echaria is still good law.
In CWN v BN, 2009, Lady Justice Hannah Okwengu, Lady Justice Philomena Mwilu,
and Justice Otieno-Odek observed that the trial judge ‘failed to appreciate the meaning of
indirect contribution’.
In SNK v MSK & 5 Others, 2010, the Court observed that indirect contribution of a
wife is a factor to be considered, even though it may not be as high as that of the husband.
In the original High Court matter, the husband had claimed that the wife had made no
personal contributions to any of the properties in dispute. Regarding the High Court’s
determination of a half share in three of the properties owned by the husband in favour of
the wife, Lady Justice Roselyne Nambuye, Justice Daniel Musinga, and Lady Justice
Agnes Murgor held that they were bound to apply the law as it was in then 1997, which
was set in Echaria that a spouse had to prove financial contribution to matrimonial
property, direct or indirect. The Court then found that the wife had made some indirect
financial contribution to the matrimonial property, though not as high as that of the
husband. The judges therefore assessed her contribution at 25%, and not at 50%.
VWN v FN (2014) was an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the
question of the extent to which Article 45 (3) of the Constitution on the equality of
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parties to a marriage applies, vis-à-vis the principles enunciated in Echaria. Justice
Waki, Justice M’Inoti and Justice Mohammed stated: ‘In light of Article 45 (3) and
Section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act which define contribution to mean monetary
and non-monetary contribution, Echaria [supra] is no longer good law’.
In FIDA-K v AG & Another (2016), Justice John Mativo in the High Court held that
‘Article 45(3) of the Constitution does not envisage 50:50 sharing of matrimonial prop-
erty, upheld s7 MPA that contribution must be proved, and held that Echaria is still good
law’.
By now we can see that some cases uphold Echaria, while others do not, as some
judges attempt to enforce the principle of ‘equality of marriage’ enunciated in Article
45(3) of the Constitution. These outcomes bring out the inconsistency in these outcomes,
and what seems to be a ‘two-steps forward, one-step back’ kind of jurisprudence. Per-
haps the Constitution’s introduction of the principle of ‘equality of marriage’ has not
changed the inconsistency in the jurisprudence in matrimonial property disputes that was
there before 2010. Notably, and to make the point that women judges have upheld
women’s matrimonial property rights while judging solo in the High Court, two women
judges did so in ZWN v PNN, and MSK v SNK. The cases in the Court of Appeal where
women judges sit alongside male judges in collegiate benches prove the obscurity of
women judges’ contributions, as the outcomes are inconsistent, sometimes upholding
Echaria, and sometimes challenging it.
Oloka-Onyango has reflected on this in wider discourses on the courts’ inconsisten-
cies in gender equality in postcolonial East Africa, suggesting that the jurisprudence is
‘manifestly gendered, and outrightly sexist’ (Oloka-Onyango, 2017), underscori the
need for more women judges in postcolonial East African judiciaries. I reflect further
on this in the next section on the gendered nature of judging in matrimonial property
disputes.
Matrimonial Property Disputes as a Gendered Discourse
Echaria is a classic example of the law’s reflection of masculine values, and male
interests (Smart, 1992). PNN v ZWN was also decided by a bench of male judges only.
Justice Kiage referred to stay-at-home partners as ‘gold-digging, sponsor-seeking,
pleasure-loving and divorce-hoping brides [and, alas, grooms]’. Justice John Mativo
in the High Court decision of FIDA v Attorney General & Another also referred to some
spouses as ‘fortune-seekers’. Although both judges apparently directed those terms to
both wives and husbands, it is a well-known fact that stay-at-home spouses/partners are
likely to be wives/women, especially mothers. This confirms the lack of value attached
to domestic and care work (see Duffy, 2011; Ferrant et al., 2014; Folbre, 2006) – any
woman that claims recognition for care work is branded a fortune-seeker. Academic #1
and Civil Society Participant #2 reflected on the gendered remarks by Justice Kiage in
the Court of Appeal and Justice Mativo in the High Court.
Critical legal feminists refute the neutrality of law, and argue that judging (which has
historically been dominated by men) has traditionally reflected male interests (Abra-
hamson, 1993; Graycar, 1998; Hensler, 1992). Carol Smart discusses the ways in which
law is sexist, male, and gendered, as it reflects masculine values (Smart, 1992). The
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masculine values reflected in these cases are the male veto of property ownership, that
was reinforced by the patriarchal coalition of African traditional patriarchy, and colonial
patriarchy. All three cases [Echaria, PNN v ZWN, and FIDA v Attorney General &
Another] were not handled by women judges, so it is not known to what extent the
reflection of these masculine values on property could have been picked up and chal-
lenged, if a woman judge sat in those cases. This is the precise point. Such biases
continue to be perpetuated in the judiciary, in the guise of neutrality and objective
principles such as contribution, when those legal principles themselves are designed
to favour men. To what extent has this kind of male bias been challenged by KWJA
members post-2010?
Collegiality and Patterns of Judgment Writing
Court of Appeal Justice #3 spoke of the difficulty of judging in a collegiate bench as a
woman [feminist] judge. Further, Court of Appeal Justice #3 stated that Echaria is
usually upheld by judges who ‘are the majority so it’s very difficult to break through’.
Court of Appeal cases are usually heard by three to five judges, and most of the time they
write a single judgment. The individual opinions, sentiments and biases of the judges are
therefore difficult to discern, unless they write a separate dissenting or concurring
judgment/opinion (Lynch and Williams, 2014: 545; McLoughlin, 2015: 288).
Several inferences can be made from an analysis of the cases post-2010. First is that
KWJA members made more bold decisions when they ruled solo in the High Court – this
happened in ZWN v PNN, and MSK v SNK & 5 Others, both decided by KWJA members.
Both KWJA members divided the matrimonial properties in a 50:50 per cent split, even
when the applicable law was Echaria in 2004 and 1997, respectively. The KWJA
member in ZWN v PNN relied on international instruments (including CEDAW).
Second, and related to the first inference is that the court matters, and by extension the
patterns and authority of judgment writing. The same KWJA member in ZWN v PNN sat
with another KWJA member and a male judge in SNK v MSK & 5 Others, where it was
determined that they were bound to apply the law as it was then in 1997 [Echaria], when
the case was filed. One cannot help but note the inconsistency here. Three cases in the
Court of Appeal illustrate this point further: PWK v JKG, CWN v BN, and SNK v MSK.
There were KWJA members in all three cases, and there was a single judgment in each,
and not a single dissent. Since 2010, there has been one dissent in the Court of Appeal,
not from a woman judge, but by Justice Kiage in PNN v ZWN – in which he argued for
the status quo in Echaria, which confirms Belleau and Johnson’s point that ‘dissents can
lean in the direction of change, as well as pull towards a status quo’ (Belleau and
Johnson, 2008: 65). One can trace the explanation for this back to Court of Appeal
Justice # 3’s response that they ‘are the majority so it’s very difficult to break through’.
Does this confirm Elliot’s assertion about women’s tendency to work towards consen-
sus? (Elliot, 2001: 47). The high level of unanimity in writing of composite judgments,
and disinclination to dissent in the Court of Appeal does not make it easy to discern what
these KWJA members’ jurisprudential contributions might be. McLoughlin writes that in
such composite judgments, there is not sufficient provocation to dissent (McLoughlin,
2015).
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An exception to this situation is in the most recent Court of Appeal judgment in MNK
v POM [2020], which was decided by two women judges and one male judge. All the
three judges wrote separate judgments – the majority wrote two separate concurring
judgments, and a KWJA member dissented. This case is discussed in the next section, to
demonstrate value of dissent as a potential site of difference (Belleau and Johnson,
2008), alongside issues of class and contemporary marriage trends.
Class and Contemporary Trends on Marriage
MNK v POM [2020] posed interesting jurisprudential concerns, that would not have been
pointed out had a KWJA member not dissented.
The trial judge in the High Court had determined that MNK and POM had not been
married during their period of cohabitation, as MNK was married to another man at the
time, and therefore lacked the capacity to marry somebody else. This decision was
reversed in the Court of Appeal, and the common law doctrine of presumption of
marriage was applied, also applicable for African customary marriages set out in Githatu
v Kiarie. MNK therefore filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court for
clear guidelines and principles in claims for presumption of marriage.
One of the majority judges had determined the issue to be ‘whether the applicant and
the respondent had cohabited and whether, during that cohabitation, they had acquired
the property in question’, and that these issues were factual, straightforward and of a
private nature, and had been determined sufficiently by the Court of Appeal that the
parties were married. Kantai JA therefore determined that the applicant MNK did not
deserve to go to the Supreme Court. A woman judge (not a KWJA member) wrote a
separate concurring judgment.
The KWJA member dissented and differed right from the issues for determination.
The KWJA member begins to set the record from the outset that POM, the cohabiting
male partner, had filed the original trial suit under section 17 of the MWPA, seeking an
order that the property in dispute be divided equally between the parties – never at any
one point did POM seek a declaration of presumption of marriage – hence the reason the
trial High Court judge dismissed the suit, as he was not satisfied that there was a
marriage.
The KWJA member, therefore, concludes that these issues raise questions of public
importance, pertaining to whether parties who are not in a recognised union of marriage
in the first place, or where one seeks a declaration of presumption of marriage, can also
file a suit under section 17 of MWPA – which comes first? The KWJA member differed
with the Court of Appeal’s determination that there was a marriage between the parties
based on a presumption of marriage.
The KWJA member’s dissent is forward-looking, pointing to a new contemporary
society where men are increasingly moving in to live with middle-class property-owning
women – unlike in the past, where women were completely reliant on the good will of
their property-owning husbands, and were therefore left destitute with their children on
the dissolution of marriage. More and more women now work, run businesses and own
property. The perceived role of men and women in society, however, has not changed –
property-owning women still must conceive, bear, and look after the children, a role that
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men do not generally perform, and for which middle-class women obtain paid help from
poorer women. How will the courts move with the times to deal with this new contem-
porary situation?
This case clearly illustrates the value of dissent as a potential ‘gendered site of judicial
difference’ (Belleau and Johnson, 2008) in two ways: first in the determination of issues,
which can lead to very different outcomes, as some may not be perceived important
enough and therefore ignored. Secondly, in the potentially forward-looking nature of the
dissent itself, as happened in this case for contemporary marriage trends in Kenya. There
are also questions of class here, that are not straightforward. One question that was not
raised, for instance, is that of non-working men married to women who are clearly the
ones making the money needed to earn the family properties – what will the non-working
men prove as indirect non-monetary contribution to marriage, when their perceived role
in society does not include care work? These are questions that KWJA members will
need to be vigilant in considering, and regarding which the KWJA member in this case
was conscious.
Conclusion
Studies on women judges have been based on a methodological individualism, that
focuses on the individual (woman) judge. I argue that this has had the effect of masking
collective and collaborative approaches of women judges. It is no wonder that the work
of national women judges’ associations, such as the KWJA, have received little or no
scholarly attention. This paper begins to redress this gap.
The empirical study I conducted in Kenya, in October to December 2018, led to the
discovery of the influential work of the KWJA under the Equality of Jurisprudence
Programme. In this paper, I have demonstrated the ways in which the KWJA influenced
property law outcomes in Kenya, and that this influence would not have been possible
without the collaborative efforts of the KWJA, at a time when there was not a single
woman judge in the Court of Appeal. The jurisprudence on equal division of matrimonial
property had begun to emerge in the mid to late 1990s, a few years after the KWJA was
formed in 1993 – this they did by training the male judges in the Court of Appeal under
the Equality of Jurisprudence Programme to rely on international human rights instru-
ments such as CEDAW, at a time when the Kenyan Constitution sanctioned discrimi-
nation against women through personal laws in a legal pluralist system. Through the
Equality of Jurisprudence Programme, male judges in the Court of Appeal passed a few
judgments recognising wives’ indirect and non-monetary contribution to marriage, up
until the passing of Echaria, that reversed that jurisprudence, requiring wives to prove
direct contribution to matrimonial property.
Post-2010, when the new constitution recognised the equality of parties to a marriage,
and the passing of the Matrimonial Property Act 2013, the standing of Echaria is at issue.
I have demonstrated that the impact of the KWJA post-2010 is much more visible in the
High Court when women judges judge individually, but much less so in the Court of
Appeal – I argue the Court of Appeal is complicated by doctrines of restraint such as
precedent (Echaria), norms of collegiality, and patterns of judgment writing, where there
is increasing unanimity and disinclination to dissent, and a prevalent practice of writing
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composite judgments. The court itself (scope of jurisdiction, rules of procedure, whether
collegiate or single-judge benches etc.) therefore matters hugely. I have also demon-
strated some evidence of the KWJA’s sensitivity to contemporary trends of marriage life
in Kenya, albeit limited at this point.
Studies on behind-the-scenes education and civilisation of male colleagues on sexism,
stereotyping and male bias (Hale and Hunter, 2008; Martin, 1993; Schroeder, 2002) are
applicable to this study on the impact of KWJA pre-2010. I also find persuasion in
Hunter’s argument for a difference in feminist as opposed to women judges (2008,
2012, 2015), Elliot’s reliance on doctrines of restraint and norms of collegiality
(2001), and Rackley’s transformative rather than inclusive diversity (2013) to locate the
findings of this study. I argue therefore that KWJA’s impact is in generating feminist (as
opposed to essentially female) property law outcomes in Kenya, that have involved
‘asking the African woman question’, to reverse the colonial ‘patriarchal coalition’ of
colonial authorities and traditional patrilineal systems (Parpart, 1988). On this basis, I
argue that the increase in women judges in Kenya would lead to a transformation not
only of the Judiciary, but also in generating a more feminist jurisprudence (Rackley,
2013), but this is complicated by the doctrines of restraint (particularly precedent), and
norms of collegiality (such as unanimity in composite judgments). Therefore, co-
ordinated programmes such as those of the KWJA will be key in influencing feminist
jurisprudence, as it cannot be left to strong and domineering individual judges in com-
posite benches on their own.
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1. See a discussion of some of these doctrines of restraint in Ginsburg (1992: 1189) where Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg discusses justiciability as ‘measured motion’; and discussions on
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‘justiciability’ in Bickel (1968); Fletcher (1968) where judges use justiciability to avoid con-
troversial decisions.
2. See Oyaro (2007).
3. Marakwet Customary Law refers to the customary law of one of the ethnic communities of
Kenya, which forms part of African Customary Law as has been restated by Cotran in his
Restatement of African Law.
4. Final Report of the Task Force on Judicial Reforms 2010, Government of Kenya, and The
Judiciary of Kenya (2019) ‘State of the Judiciary and Administration of Justice Report 2016–
2017’, Nairobi, p. 129. Available at: https://www.judiciary.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/
sojar20172018.pdf (accessed 15 October 2019).
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